Introduction
The Cold War had different meanings for Turkey and the nationalist Arab countries, emanating from their security needs and threat perceptions.
For Turkey, the Cold War was characterized by the Soviet threat, which entailed territorial demands on its Eastern region, specifically Kars and Ardahan and demands for bases on the Turkish straits. This state of affairs led Turkey to join the Western bloc, which culminated in its membership in NATO in 1952. Russians were perceived as the source of threat against which Turkey allied with the United States. In that vein, Turkish-Soviet friendship betvveen 1921-1945 seems like an anomaly in the centuries-long rivalry and the Cold War dynamics very much reminded the Turks of the expansionist neighbor from the north.
For Arabs, on the other hand, the USSR did not pose an immediate threat since they were not geographically contiguous to that country. On the contrary, the Soviet Union became an important country supporting the Arab cause in international fora. Military and economic aid flowed from the Soviet Union to the revolutionary Arab countries.
The main threat for the Arab countries vvas Israel and the majör area of contention vvas Palestine, vvhich had to be resolved before a viable peace vvere to be established in the Middle East.
Turkish-Arab differences became more manifest vvith the establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 by vvhich Turkey and most Arab countries, except Iraq vvere on different sides. Nasser perceived the Baghdad Pact as the continuation of Western colonialism, vvhich purported to further their hegemony in an implicit manner as opposed to the direct colonialism of the past.
The divergent perceptions of Turkey and the revolutionary Arab countries tovvards the Cold War led to the problematic relations betvveen Turkey and the Arab countries. It is a function of the different geopolitical contexts of the relevant countries. Their respective identities also played important roles in the orientations of the countries in question. This state of affairs led to the further exacerbation of Turkish-Arab antagonism, vvhich is historically and ideologically embedded. One point of clarifıcation vvould be in order here. By diverging perceptions, vve do not imply a psychological analysis of the leaders of Turkey and Arab countries. We simply employ this concept to demonstrate the contrasting geopolitical and ideological propensities of these regimes had a direct impact on their foreign policy outcomes. In other vvords, the Cold War had different meanings to Turkey and the Arab states.
We vvill try to ansvver the question about the kind of factors vvhich affected these different perceptions and vvill focus particularly on the Baghdad Pact and the political developments of the 1950s. We vvill not deal vvith the developments after the dissolution of the Baghdad Pact. The main actors in this study are the US and Turkey on the one hand, the Soviet Union, Egypt and Syria on the other. Iraq is relevant fırst as a founding member of the Baghdad Pact and after 1958 as a country joining the revolutionary camp of Arab states. It should be added that this study mainly focuses on Arab nationalist states but not on the moderate monarchies. We use radical, nationalist or revolutionary Arab states interchangeably and vvith those terms vve are referring especially to Egypt and Syria. They are republican regimes, practicing some form of Arab socialism. They vvere closer to the Soviet bloc, despite the fact that Egypt in particular claimed to have follovved a neutral foreign policy. Conservative or moderate Arab states included Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon, vvhich vvere usually pro-Western. We vvill also deal vvith the role of regional actors and Great Britain as a member of the Baghdad Pact.
We divided our study into three parts. In the first part, vve vvill analyze the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Arab avvakening, the origins of Arab-Turkish antagonism and the roots of the Arab and Turkish nationalisms.
In the second part of our study, vve vvill focus on the US and the USSR's interests in the Middle East, especially in the 1950s, as vvell as the advent of the Cold War to the Middle East. The political atmosphere of the 1950s demonstrates the different problems and geo-strategic threats facing Turkey and the Arab countries.
In the third part, vve vvill analyze the creation of the Baghdad Pact, the role of Turkey, its threat perception, and the responses of nationalist Arab countries (i.e., Egypt and Syria). The roles and expectations of these countries, vvhich were parties to the Pact, and the regional Arab states such as Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia will also be studied.
The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab Awakening
The rise of nationalist sentiments in the Ottoman Empire made the continuation of the Ottoman polity highly unlikely. First, the nonMuslim Christian subjects have gained independence and then Müslim peoples such as Albanians and Arabs demanded independence.
The Ottomans captured most areas of the Middle East in the sixteenth century and held them until the 20 th century. Selim I captured most of Mashreq and Egypt in 1516-1517.' There vvas relative calm in the region until the nineteenth century, vvhen Arab nationalism emerged first in Lebanon, then spread to the larger area of Mashreq and later, in the tvventieth century to Arabia and Egypt. Until that time Arabs did not perceive Turkish rule as foreign and considered themselves as an integral part of the Müslim empire.
2
Even though Antonius has claimed that Mehmet Ali and his son ibrahim, after being the masters of Egypt in the beginning of the nineteenth century, vvanted to create an Arab Empire, he also admits that at the time there vvas no Arab national consciousness 3 among the elite and the populace. The fact that Mehmet Ali vvas of Albanian origin proves this point. Demands for Arab national independence had to vvait the avvakening of national consciousness first among the intellectuals, then the masses in the tvventieth century. lastly the political demand of Arab independence. 4 These three stages categorize the evolution of Arab nationalism rather succinctly; starting with the cultural developments of late 19 01 century, the emergence of some literary and then political societies and culminating in the revolt of Sharif Hussein, manifesting the political phase of the Arab national movement.
Actually, until the revolt of Sharif Hussein, manifestations of Arab nationalism were confıned to educated classes and did not have any mass following. Arab-Turkish antagonism has its roots in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. The destruction of the Ottoman Empire, and the failure of the Ottomanist project, in other words the endeavor to create Ottoman citizens out of the different religious and ethnic subjects of the Empire resulted in redefınition of people's political identities. The Arab and Turkish nationalisms more or less simultaneously emerged. There was a vvidespread belief that Arab nationalism was a reaction against the Union and Progress Party's Turkifıcation policies. Our understanding of the subject is that the rise of two nationalisms emerged more or less at the same time at the end of the nineteenth century and that in the age of nationalism a multi-national political entity like the Ottoman Empire could not have survived.
The development that was critical in the emergence of Arab avvakening was the coming of missionaries and their establishment of schools since they helped to reinvigorate the Arabic language as they have encouraged the writing of Arabic textbooks, dictionaries and encyclopedias, as well as the translation of the Bible. Numerous printing presses vvere transferred to numerous cities in Syria. Nasef al-Yazeji and Butrus al-Bustani vvere important fıgures in this intellectual project. It should also be added that Soviet territorial demands on Turkey and pressure for bases on the Turkish Straits very much pushed Turkey into America's arms. would follovv suit. 32 This was one of the earliest expressions of the domino theory which argued that fail of one country to communism vvould lead to the spread of communism, like wild fire, to the other counties in the region. 33 It would be in order to argue that the two superpovvers, United States and the Soviet Union vvere concerned in converting as many local allies as possible in the Middle East since they were involved in a global struggle to win the minds and hearts of nations, in which no state-no matter how small-vvas expendable. Acquiring a new ally for one superpovver meant a loss for the other superpovver, hence increasing the povver of the süper power that got the nevv ally. Regional powers such as Egypt played one süper power against the other to get more economic and military aid. Britain and France were concerned about preserving their former colonial status in a new form by alliances and protecting their interests in the region. Ironically, their endeavor to preserve their preponderant status in the Middle East led to their strategic overextension and culminated in their loss of hegemony in the region, particularly after the 1956 Suez War.
Cold War and the Middle East in the 1950s: The Baghdad Pact
Arab nationalist identity got stronger after monarchies vvere overthrovvn in Egypt in 1952, in Iraq in 1958; and in Syria after independence in 1946. In other vvords, as Arab states gained independence and created nationalist state identities, the historical and ideological incompatibilities betvveen them and Turkey further exacerbated the geopolitical factors that led to conflicting vievvs of the Cold War. But the latter's foreign policy behavior can also be explained by the balance of threat theory articulated by Stephen Walt, vvho argues that states balance against the source of threat not against 32 the source of power as balance of power theory contends. 34 Threat perception of the Soviets did not result in the portrayal of a dangerous Soviet Union, rather the real threat came from Israel and Britain and France.
Iraqi-Turkish treaty of 1955 evolved into the Baghdad Pact. The other parties to the Pact were Britain, Iran and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia was suspicious of the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan who were the traditional rivals of the Saudis during the time for the quest of Arabia. For this reason, it vvas against the Baghdad Pact. Egypt opposed alliances with majör powers and perceived them as manifestations of imperialism. Nasser did not believe in the Soviet threat, so he argued the Pact vvas created to prolong Western domination as for him a pact built to counter the Soviet threat was unrealistic. 35 The American administration supported the Baghdad Pact even though it did not become a party to it. 36 The reason for this state of affairs vvas the negative attitude of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to the Pact and the fact that Eisenhower Administration wanted to improve relations with Nasser. Also joining such a Pact would lead to demands for extending security measures to Israel, an eventuality Dulles in particular was against. 37 Having said that hovvever, it should be pointed out that the Baghdad Pact was signed between the parties as part of the American global strategy of containment and upon American encouragement. 40 King Hussein in his memoirs admits that he vvas sympathetic to the Pact but the riots instigated by Egypt caused great concern for the stability in Jordan. He vvas unable to join the Pact due to the grave dangers to his kingdom as government buildings vvere burned and the 39 Barnett, Dialogues in Arab politics. government could restore order only by calling in the army-the Arab Legion. 41 It should be noted that the Turkish-Iraqi pact invited any member of the Arab League or any country that was interested in regional security for accession. Britain joined the pact on April 4, 1955. Pakistan joined in September and Iran in October 1955. The United States did not formally join the pact but vvas the motor behind it as an instrument in containing the Soviets. Dulles put the Northern Tier idea forvvard in 1953 and vvith the creation of the Baghdad Pact his ideas vvere concretized. The Müslim members of the Pact joined it to get more arms from the United States, vvhereas Britain joined the Pact to preserve its povver in the Middle East. It vvas also interested in keeping its bases in Iraq vvhich vvere to expire in 1956, and continue its influence around the Suez Canal. 42 Nationalist Arab states perceived Turkey, due to its participation in the Pact, as a tool of Western imperialism. 43 Evidently, diverging threat perceptions betvveen Turkey and the radical Arab states account for this state of affairs. And it should also be noted that the diverging perceptions emanated from geopolitical realities, not some politico-psychological factors.
Eisenhovver Doctrine of 1957 made protection of the Middle East explicit, vvhich vvas implicit in the Truman Doctrine. President Eisenhovver made it clear that the United States administration vvould send armed forces to protect the Middle East if there vvere a direct attack on the region from a state "controlled by international communism". 44 One related topic of the Eisenhovver administration was the possibility that Syria vvould turn into a communist state and there vvere plans to forcefully change such an eventuality.
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The 1956 49 Gerges argues that Iraq's accession to the Baghdad Pact vvas one of the most important reasons for the overthrovv of the monarchy. 50 
Conclusion
Middle Eastern politics during the Cold War should be analyzed as a function of the interaction betvveen the superpovvers and their endeavors to penetrate the area, as vvell as the liaisons betvveen the superpovvers and the Middle Eastern states. Regional states, especially Egypt, played one superpovver against the other and contrary to realist thought in international relations theory, there vvas no one-vvay influence running from the United States and the Soviet Union tovvards the Middle East; rather there vvas mutual influence running from the superpovvers tovvards the regional states but also from regional states tovvards the superpovvers. Hence both regional and international factors are important in understanding Middle Eastern politics. The United States and the USSR vvere open to influence from the smaller states because they vvere very much concerned vvith keeping allies and preventing their adversary from getting nevv allies. 53 The rivalry betvveen Egypt, Syria against Iraq and Turkey could also be seen as the competition for regional hegemony. Leadership interests. He believed in a different kind of nationalism that was based on the sovereign equality of Arab states 54 The core doctrine of Arab states' foreign policies, even if they were only at the rhetorical level, included nonalignment, neutrality, support for the Palestinian cause, ostracizing Israel and propagating Arab unity. 55 What Barnett calls norms of Arabism 56 and what Gerges 57 calls all-Arab consensus dictated respect to these ideas, constructed Arab states' identities and constituted legitimate and illegitimate foreign policy behaviors. The norms of Arabism proscribed and prescribed proper ways of behavior for Arab states, so states such as Jordan and Lebanon wanted to establish close relations vvith the Western povvers vvere prevented because of ideational factors that vvere provoked by Nasser. So the ideas controlled their state identity and hence influenced their foreign policy behavior. State sovereignty vvas constrained by ideas of Arab nationalism. But it should also be added that the geopolitical situation of the Arab countries allovved such a policy, particularly since most neighbors of USSR vvere Soviet satellites. In conclusion, it vvould be in order to say that both ideas and interests led to the divergent policies of Turkey and the nationalist Arab states. In this vein, both constructivism vvith its emphasis on ideas and identities and realism vvith its focus on povver and strategy are relevant theories of international relations for the explication of the diverging perceptions of Turks and Arabs of the Baghdad Pact.
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